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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GENEVA MELDRUM 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
-vs.-
KLARENCE MELDRUM 
Defendant-Appellant 
APPELLANTS BRIEF 
NATURE OF CASE 
This is an appeal by the defendant, Klarence Meldrum, 
from that part of a judgment which directed payment to 
plaintiff of $23,714.58 from funds held in escrow under a 
contract of sale executed by plaintiff and defendant, and 
denying defendant relief which he claims to be entitled to 
under that contract. Defendant contends that the trial 
court erred in failing to give effect to the contract of sale 
and in interpretation of a written agreement for extension 
of time; also in rejecting evidence offered by defendant to 
show no default on the part of defendant; also in refusing 
to award defendant judgment as prayed for in his 
counterclaim. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
After trial of issues the court directed counsel for 
defendant to submit proposed findings of fact, conclusions 
of law and judgment. This was done and counsel for 
plaintiff filed objections and a draft of proposed findings, 
conclusions and judgment, to which counsel for defendant 
filed objections. After further hearing the court took the 
l 
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matter under advisement and thereafter signed and 
entered findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment 
substantially as propsed by counsel for plaintiff. Defen-
dant then filed motion for new trial. This was'overruled 
and denied by the court and defendant then filed notice of 
appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant (appellant) prays for reversal of rulings of 
the trial court on points herein contended by defendant to 
be erroneous, and that the trial court be directed to render 
judgment as prayed for in defendant's counterclaim. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Under date of April 1,1964, the plaintiff as seller entered 
into a contract of sale with her son Klarence Meldrum as 
buyer for sale of plaintiff's half interest in a ranch 
property in Juab County and in approximately 30 head of 
cattle and certain farm machinery and equipment. The 
other half interest in the ranch and personal property was 
owned by another son of plaintiff, viz. James R. Meldrum. 
The property was covered by two mortgages, one to 
Equitable Life Assurance Society and one to Ralph 
Meldrum as administrator of the estate of Reed Duke 
Meldrum. The contract between plaintiff and defendant 
called for a purchase price of $40,000.00 to be paid in 
annual installments of $2,500.00 on or before December 1 of 
each year and defendant was required to assume payment 
of plaintiff's portion of the mortgage debts mentioned but 
was to be given credit on the purchase price for such 
mortgage payments. Plaintiff was chargeable with 29 per 
2 
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cent of the mortgage debt to Equitable Life Assurance 
Society and 50 per cent of the debt to Ralph Meldrum. The 
remaining portions of such mortgage debts were charge-
able against James R. Meldrum. A copy of the 1964 
contract between plaintiff and defendant is attached to 
plaintiff's complaint, (r.6-11) 
After execution of the 1964 contract of sale, the 
defendant, together with his brother, James R. Meldrum, 
operated the ranch property until Aprill969 and made 
payments required on the mortgage debts. Defendant also 
paid to plaintiff various installments aggregating $8,004.11 
prior to the execution of the Rasmussen contract 
hereinafter referred to. (r.165) 
On or about September 1968 the defendant and his 
brother, James R. Meldrum, were solicited by a realtor for 
an option of sale of the ranch property and thereafter, on 
or about April, 1969, a contract of sale was executed by 
them. That contract, hereinafter referred to as the 
Rasmussen contract, (R.12) provided for sale of the ranch 
property to Lowell H. Rasmussen and wife, for a total 
purchase price of $158,000.00. The plaintiff also signed that 
contract. The purchase price was to be paid $5,000.00 down 
and $20,000.00 on or before May 1,1969, and the balance in 
annual installments of $19,000.00 plus interest at 5y2 per 
cent on May 1 in the years 1971, 1972, 1973, 1974, 1975 and 
1976. The contract provided that a real estate agent's 
commission of $7,900.00 should be paid to the realtor out of 
the first two installments of purchase price. The contract 
further provided that the sellers should execute and 
deposit in escrow with Walker Bank & Trust Company a 
deed of the property and that payments should be made to 
said escrow agent according to the terms of the contract. 
The contract did not specify how payments made to the 
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escrow agent were to be disbursed but did contain the 
following provisions: (R.21,22) 
''19. Sellers agree to execute a statement of how 
and in what amounts the purchase price is to be 
disbursed to the Mortgagees and the Seller 
mentioned herein" 
"25. The Seller agrees to furnish Walker Bank & 
Trust Company, the escrow agent in this matter, 
and the Buyer herein, with a statement of the 
portion each Seller is to receive from the purchase 
rice to be paid hereunder.'' 
Concurrently with the signing of the Rasmussen 
contract two letters of instruction addressed to Walker 
Bank & Trust Company as escrow agent were signed by 
plaintiff and defendant and James R. Meldrum, copies of 
which letters are attached to defendant's Affirmative 
Answer and Counterclaim herein (R.32, R.34). These 
letters show that no agreement had been made between 
plaintiff and defendant as to allocation between them of 
funds to be received by said escrow agent but do contain 
the following recital: (R.33) 
"The portion payable to Geneva Meldrum and 
Klarence Meldrum shall be divided between them 
as they may hereafter agree and notify said Walker 
Bank & Trust Company, or as may hereafter be 
determined by the court." 
The Rasmussen contract was deposited with Walker 
Bank & Trust Company at Provo, Utah, as escrow agent. A 
copy of same is attached to plaintiff's complaint herein 
(R.12). A copy of the 1964 contract of sale between plaintiff 
and defendant is also attached to plaintiff's complaint 
(R.6). 
4 
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After deposit of the escrow, a disagreement developed 
between plaintiff and defendant as to distribution of funds 
received by the escrow agent. Plaintiff contended that she 
was entitled to 65.81 per cent of funds received and to be 
received for credit of plaintiff and defendant, and that the 
defendant was entitled to receive only 34.19 per cent of 
such funds. (See allegations of plaintiff's complaint) 
(R.5). Defendant disagreed with this contention but made 
offers in writing to permit plaintiff to receive one-half of 
funds received and to be received for credit of plaintiff and 
defendant until plaintiff should be fully paid in accordance 
with her 1964 contract with defendant. (Tr. A-57 and 
Exhibit D-l-A, D-2, D-3, D-4, D-5) Plaintiff rejected these 
offers and contended that the 1964 contract with defendant 
was superseded by the Rasmussen contract and that she 
was entitled to 65.81 per cent of funds payable under said 
contract for the half interest in the ranch property covered 
by her 1964 contract with defendant. 
Prior to date for payment of the 1970 installment on the 
Rasmussen contract he requested consent of plaintiff and 
defendant and James R. Meldrum to an extension of time 
for making that payment, and offered to pay 8 per cent 
interest instead of 5% per cent on the $19,000.00 installment 
during such extension of time. The request was granted 
and an agreement for extension of time signed by the 
parties in language as follows: (R68) 
"This agreement, entered into this day of 
April, 1970, by and between Geneva Meldrum, 
Klarence T. Meldru, and James R. Meldrum, 
hereinafter designated as the seller and Lowell H. 
Rasmusson and Barbara Frazier Rasmusson, 
husband and wife, hereinafter designated as the 
buyer. -
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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WHEREAS, the seller desires to grant the buyer 
an extension in making one of the payment due on a 
Uniform Real Estate Contract, entered into be-
tween the parties relating to the real property in 
Juab County, State of Utah, and more particularly 
described in said Uniform Real Estate Contract as 
being dated November 1, 1968, with the above 
named persons as the parties thereto and. 
WHEREAS, buyer desires to pay more interest 
for the extension as the consideration for the exten-
sion in one payment. 
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the 
premises hereinafter set forth, the parties agree as 
follows. 
1. Seller hereby grants to the buyer an extension 
of time to make the payment due on May 1, 1970, 
under Uniform Real Estate Contract, dated No-
vember 1,1968, between sellers and buyer relating 
to property in Juab County, State of Utah, and 
sellers agree to extend the $19,000.00 plus an 
accrued interest payment due on May 1,1970, under 
said contract so that it will not be due until on or 
before September 15, 1970, and all other payments 
are to be as provided for in said Uniform Real 
Estate Contract. 
2. In consideration of this extension, buyer agrees 
to increase the interest from 5% per cent per 
annum to 8 per cent per annum on the $19,000.00 
payment and for the period from May 1, 1970, until 
said $19,000.00 payment plus an acrued interest is 
paid on or before September 15, 1970, but it is 
understood that all other principle which is unpaid 
shall bear the 5% per cent per annum rate provided 
for in said Uniform Real Estate Contract and all 
other payments provided under said contract shall 
be due and payable in the manner provided for in 
said Uniform Real Estate Contract. 
3. Except as hereinbefore expressly stated, both 
seller and buyer agree that the Uniform Real 
Estate Contract, dated November 1, 1968, between 
them relating to the property in Juab County, shall 
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remain in full force and effect and the terms shall 
be as provided for therein.'' 
The 1970 installment of principal and interest was not 
paid until May 5,1971, at which time a payment was made 
in the amount of $46,374.84. Counsel for plaintiff had 
notified Walker Bank as escrow agent not to pay anything 
to defendant except upon written stipulation or order 
signed by plaintiff or final adjudication by the court, and 
the bank had followed plaintiff's instructions. But during 
the impasse as to distribution of funds, several stipulations 
were signed at various dates between plaintiff and 
defendant for release of specified amounts to plaintiff and 
defendant respectively but with express provisions tha 
such stipulations should not be construed as evidence as to 
the rights of either party in the final distribution of 
escrowed funds. Pursuant to these stipulations the escrow 
agent had paid out various amounts to plaintiff and 
defendant. The escrow agent also made payments on the 
Equitable Life mortgage and the Ralph Meldrum mort-
gage in accordance with original instructions given to it. 
(R.165,166) 
On January 17, 1972 plaintiff commenced this action, 
setting forth in the complaint (R.6) the 1964 contract of 
sale executed by plaintiff and defendant, also the 1969 
contract with Rasmussen (R.12) and alleging that the 
Rasmussen contract "constituted a form of novation" of 
the 1964 contract and that the Court should determine 
(R.5) that the plaintiff is entitled to receive 65.81 per cent 
of funds received and to be received from the Buyer under 
the Rasmussen contract. Also alleging that defendant 
should be required to pay plaintiff's attorney's fees and 
costs. The complaint also alleged that at the time of 
execution of the Rasmussen contract the defendant had 
7 
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paid to the plaintiff $11,509.79 leaving a balance of 
$28,490.21 then due on the principal of the 1964 contract. 
The complaint prayed for judgment that plaintiff is 
entitled to receive 65.81 per cent of sums received and to be 
received by the paties under the Rasmussen contract and 
that the escrow agent be ordered to disburse to plaintiff 
65.81 per cent of funds received by it under said contract, 
also that plaintiff should have judgment against defendant 
for any sums he had received in excess of 34.19 per cent; 
also that plaintiff have judgment for attorney fees and 
costs. 
To this complaint the defendant filed his answer and 
counterclaim (r.25). In this the defendant admitted the 
execution of the 1964 contract with plaintiff and the 
execution on or about April 1, 1969 by plaintiff and 
defendant and James R. Meldrum of the Rasmussen 
contract. Defendant denied that he was at fault or in 
default on his 1964 contract with plaintiff at the time of 
execution of the Rasmussen contract or at any later time 
and denied that the plaintiff was entitled to judgment for 
attorney fees or costs and alleged that on the contrary 
defendant was entitled to his costs and attorney fee. 
As a further and affirmative defence defendat specifi-
cally denied that the Rasmussen contract constituted any 
novation or substitute for his 1964 contract with plaintiff. 
Defendant alleged that his 1964 contract was in full force 
and effect and that at the time of execution of the 
Rasmussen contract defendant had paid to plaintiff on his 
1964 contract the sum of $8,004.11 and was then also 
entitled to credit for mortgage payments made by him on 
plaintiff's portion of mortgages to Equitable Life Assur-
ance Society and Reed Meldrum required by said 1964 
contract to be paid by defendant. Defendant further denied 
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that the Buyers under the Rasmussen contract had paid 
the sum of $79,000.00 on defendant's equity under said 
contract and alleged that from amounts paid by said 
Buyers to the escrow holder the plaintiff had received 
$14,867.95 and the defendant had received only $16,367.96. 
Defendant further alleged that he was entitled to credits on 
his 1964 contract with plaintiff for payments made by the 
escrow agent on plaintiff's portion of the mortgages above 
mentioned. 
As a further and affirmative defense and counterclaim 
the defendant alleged that the plaintiff signed the 
Rasmussen contract with defendant and James R. 
Meldrum by reason of the fact that the deed required to be 
executed by the terms of her 1964 contract with defendant 
had not then been delivered, and that plaintiff signed said 
Rasmussen contract without any agreement made by 
defendant for termination or surrender of his rights under 
his 1964 contract with plaintiff. Defendan also alleged that 
said Rasmussen contract contains no provision for 
allocation or division of payments to be made thereunder 
between plaintiff and defendant but does contain the 
following recital: 
"25. The Seller agrees to furnish Walker Bank & 
Trust Company, the escrow agent in this matter, 
and the Buyer herein, with a statement of the por-
tion each Seller is to receive from the purchase 
price to be paid hereunder." 
Also, that concurrently with execution of the Rasmussen 
contract, two letters of instruction addressed to said 
escrow agent were signed by plaintiff and defendant and 
James R. Meldrum and delivered to said bank, and that 
these letters of instruction to said escrow agent contained 
the following recital: 
9 
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'The portion payable to Geneva Meldrum and 
Klarence Meldrum shall be divded between them 
as they may hereafter agree and notify said Walker 
Bank & Trust Company or as may be determined 
by court." 
Copies of said letters of instruction to said escrow agent 
are attached to defendant's answer and were incorporated 
by reference (R.32, R.34). 
Defendant further alleged that plaintiff, by her attorney, 
had instructed said bank to refrain from disbursement of 
any funds to the defendant except upon written authoriza-
tion signed by the plaintiff or upon a court order. Also that 
defendnat had repeatedly requested the plaintiff to agree 
upon distribution of funds under said escrow in accordance 
with rights of plaintiff and defendant as fixed by their 1964 
contract but plaintiff has refused and continues to refuse to 
agree to such distribution. Defendant further alleged that 
at the time of plaintiff's commencement of this action the 
total amount paid on the Rasmussen contract did not 
exceed $42,464.73 of which one-half was allowable to James 
R. Meldrum and that plaintiff had then received from 
payments made by Rasmussen the sum of $16,117.95, 
including $1,250.00 paid direct to plaintiff by Rasmussen; 
also that defendant was entitled to creidts on his contract 
with plaintiff for $8,004.11 paid to plaintiff prior to the 
Rasmussen contract and other credits for payments made 
by defendant on plaintiff's share of mortgage debt to Reed 
Meldrum in the amount of $3,000.00 and on plaintiff's share 
of mortgage debt to Equitable Life Assurance Society in 
the amount of $2,407.00, making a total of credit then due 
defendant on his 1964 contract with plaintiff in the amount 
of at least $32,840.08. 
10 
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Defendant prayed for judgment and decree declaring 
that the Rasmussen contract did not annul or supersede or 
constitute a substitute for the 1964 contract of sale and that 
said contract was still in full force and effect and that 
defendant was not in default; also that Walker Bank & 
Trust Company, as escrow agent, be directed to disburse 
funds received by it in accordance with the decision of the 
court unless otherwise agreed to by plaintiff and 
defendant; also that defendant have his costs and a 
reasonable fee for services of his attorney. 
Plaintiff filed a reply to defendant's counterclaim (R.37) 
admitting the execution of the 1964 contract of sale by 
plaintiff and defendant and that a disagreement had 
developed between plaintiff and defendant and that 
plaintiff had given notice to the bank as alleged by 
defendant, and denying generally the remaining allega-
tions of the counterclaim. 
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT 
On February 11, 1972, defendant made demand upon 
plaintiff for answers to interrogatories as show by the 
record herein. (R. 39) Plaintiff made answer (R.43) under 
date of February 22, 1972, to some of said interrogatories 
and therin admitted that plaintiff had received from 
defendant $8,004.11 prior to the Rasmussen contract; also 
that defendant had then paid on plaintiff's portion of the 
mortgage debt to Equitable Life Assurance Society 
$1,450.00; also $2,055.69 on plaintiff's portion of the Reed 
Meldrum mortgage; also that plaintiff had received from 
the escrow agent, subsequent to the Rasmussen contract, 
$4,502.50 in April or May 1969, $1,000.00 on or about May 7, 
11 
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1971, $1,500.00 on or about June 1, 1971 and $7,585.45 
December 15, 1971, making a total admitted as then 
received by plaintiff from the escrow agent $14,587.95; also 
that plaintiff had received direct payment from Rasmus-
sen in amount $1,250.00. 
A pretrial hearing was had before the Court April 3,1972, 
but no pre-trial order was made. (R.50) 
A further hearing was had before the court on June 26, 
1972 (R.52) and thereafter, under date of March 7,1973 the 
Court signed and filed a Memorandum Decision (R.87) in 
which it was adjudged and declared that the rights, duties 
and obligations of the plaintiff and defendant should be 
determined from the 1964 contract of sale and that such 
agreement was "not modified, amended, merged or 
novated'' by the contract with Rasmirssen. 
Subsequent to the filing of this decision towit on March 
25, 1973 the defendant filed a motion for allowance of 
interest to the defendant on funds found by the court to be 
due to defendant from the escrow holder, also for attorney 
fees. (R.93) Plaintiff also filed a motion for allowance of 
interest and attorney fee to plaintiff. (R.95) Counsel for 
defendant also submitted to the court proposed findings of 
fact, conclusions of law and judgment (Court Exhibit "A") 
and served a copy upon plaintiff's counself and requested 
counsel for plaintiff to submit prior to July 10, 1973, a 
statement of points of disagreement if any with such 
proposed findings and conclusions. 
A hearing was had before the court April 10, 1973 on 
defendant's propsed findings of fact and conclusions of law 
(Court Exhibit "A") Defendants Exhibit D-l-A was 
offered by defendant and received (R.99). At this hearing 
12 
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counsel for plaintiff conceded the correctness of defend-
ant's proposed findings of fact, but thereafter under date 
of April 17, 1973 filed a Supplemental Memorandum 
(R.105) alleging that plaintiff was in error in admitting a 
payment of $3,369.60 claimed by defendant to have been 
made on the Equitable Life Assurance mortgage prior to 
the Rasmussen contract, and alleging that the correct 
amount was $2,407.00 as set forth in defendant's answer 
and counterclaim. In plaintiff's memorandum it was 
admitted however, that except for the above item, 
defendant's statement of credits claimed in his proposed 
findings was correct. (R.105) 
Thereafter, counsel for defendant prepared and submit-
ted to the Court a revised draft of defendant's proposed 
findings of fact, conclusios of law and judgment (R.115) 
and served a copy upon plaintiff's counsel together with a 
renewal of defendant's demand made 22 March 1973 for 
answers to interrogatories. (R.125) In response to this 
counsel for plaintiff filed Objections to Defendant's 
Demand for Answers to Interrogatories and also submit-
ted plaintiff's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law and Judgment (R.177) in which it was proposed 
that plaintiff have judgment directing the escrow agent to 
disburse $23,014.11 to plaintiff and that each party should 
bear their own costs and attorney fees. Defendant filed 
objections to Plaintiff's proposed findings, conclusions and 
judgment. (R.182). 
Under date of October 20, 1973 defendant filed a Motion 
for Ruling Upon Legal Issues (R.139) and on October 27, 
1973, made a renewal of demand for answers to 
interrogatories dated July 26, 1973. (R.143) 
13 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
On November 13, 1973 the case came on for hearing on 
pending motions and objections. (Tr A-l) Plaintiff's 
Exhibits P-l, P-2, P-3 and P-4 were offered by plaintiff and 
received. Defendant's Exhibits D-1, D-2, D-3, D-4 and D-5 
were offered by defendant but objected to by plaintiff and 
the objection was sustained. The Court then directed 
counsel for plaintiff to submit revised findings of fact, 
conclusions of law and judgment and allowed defendant 
ten days after receipt of same to file objections. Plaintiff 
thereafter on November 28, 1973, submitted revised 
proposed findings, conclusions and judgment (R-159-168) 
and on December 5,1973 defendant filed objections thereto 
(R-182). 
Thereafter on December 11, 1973, the case came on for 
hearing on pending motions and objection (R. 156, Tr. B-l). 
The Court requested counsel for the respective parties to 
endeavor to agree upon pending issues and then, upon 
their announcement of failure to agree, the Court ordered 
the case set for trial at 1:30 p.m. of that day. Counsel for 
defendant then offered in evidence documentary exhibits 
D-6 and D-7 to which plaintiff objected and the Court 
sustained the objection (Tr. B-8, 11, 14). Defendant then 
moved for a continuance to permit defendant to produce 
further evidence as to receipts and disbursements made 
by the escrow agent. (Tr. B-16) Plaintiff objected to this 
and the Court denied defendant's motion and took the case 
under advisement. 
On December 17, 1973, defendant filed a motion for the 
Court to make specific findings of fact upon all matters of 
fact referred to in defendant's objections to plaintiff's 
proposed findings of fact. (R.157) 
14 
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Thereafter the court signed an order overruling 
defendant's objection (R.169) and signed findings of fact, 
conclusions of law and judgment substantially as proposed 
by counsel for plaintiff. (R.159) These were filed with the 
clker and entered under date of March 4, 1974. Defendant 
then filed under date of March 12, 1974, a motion for new 
trial. (R.173) This was overruled by the Court April 9,1974, 
(r.175) and defendant filed notice of appeal May 6, 1974. 
(R.176) Defendant filed his designation of record on appeal 
May 16,1974 (R.203) and therein designated all pleadings, 
motions and objections filed by the parties and all exhibits 
and other papers and all orders of the court to be included 
in the record. Reporters transcript was ordered May 1,1974. 
Bond for costs on appeal was filed May 20,1974 (R.205). On 
June 14, 1974 an order was signed by the Honorable J. 
Harlan Burns, District Judge, extending time for filing 
record on appeal to and including August 6, 1974. On 
August 2,1974 a further order was signed by the Honorable 
A. H. Ellett, Associate Justice, extending time for filing 
the record on appeal to and including August 20, 1974. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
THE COURT FOUND AND ADJUDGED THAT 
THE RIGHTS OF PLAINTIFF AND DEFEN-
DANT SHOULD BE DETERMINED FROM A 1964 
CONTRACT OF SALE EXECUTED BY THEM. 
BUT THE COURT THEN RENDERED JUDG-
MENT INCONSISTENT WITH THAT CONTRACT 
AND WHICH DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF A 
SUBSTANTIAL PORTION OF FUNDS TO WHICH 
HE WAS ENTITLED UNDER THE SAID CON-
TRACT. 
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The Court decided on March 7,1973 that the 1964 contract 
signed by plaintiff and defendant constitutes the contract 
under which the rights of plaintiff and defendant herein 
should be determined—and that such contract was not 
modified or superseded by the Rasmussen contract. (R.87, 
R. 196). It must therefore be decided (a) what payments 
were required by that contract and when, and (b) what 
payments were made and when. The Court's findings show 
(R.165) that defendant had made payments to plaintiff in 
the amount of $8,004.11 prior to the Rasmussen contract. 
Also that plaintiff had thereafter, and prior to commence-
ment of this action, received from the escrow agent 
$14,587.95 and from Lowell Rasmussen $1,250.00 (R.43)— 
making a total thus found to have been received by 
plaintiff at that time to be $15,837.95 (R.165). In addition to 
this, defendant had paid on plaintiff's portion of the 
mortgage debt to Equitable Life Assurance Society at 
least $1,450.00 and at least $2,055.69 on the plaintiff's 
portion of the mortgage debt to Reed Meldrum (R.43). By 
no reasonable view of the language of the 1964 contract can 
it be said that defendant was in default at the time of the 
commencement of this action. The contract called for 
payment of a maximum of $2,500.00 per year to 
plaintiff—without interest—except that in event of default 
in payment of any installment the delinquency shall bear 
interest at 3 per cent per annum. 
Not only was the defendant not in default at the time of 
commencement of this action but he had theretofore, in 
writing, several times, proffered to allow the plaintiff to 
receive from the escrow agent fifty per cent of payments 
made by Rasmussen on the portion of the ranch covered by 
defendant's contract with plaintiff until plaintiff should be 
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fully paid in accordance with the 1964 contract. See 
Exhibits offered by defendant—D-l, D-2, D-3, D-4, D-5. 
(Tr. 57) That proffer was continuously refused by plaintiff, 
and her counsel constantly contended that the Rasmussen 
contract superseded the 1964 contract and that plaintiff 
was entitled to 65.81 per cent of moneys becoming due 
from Rasmussen on defendant's portion of the purchase of 
the ranch property. (See plaintiff's complaint.) (R.5). 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO MAKE A 
FINDING THAT DEFENDANT WAS NOT IN 
DEFAULT ON HIS CONTRACT WITH PLAIN-
TIFF AT THE TIME OF COMMENCEMENT OF 
THIS ACTION OR AT ANY TIME THEREAFTER. 
The defendant alleged in his Answer and Counterclaim 
that he had repeatedly requested plaintiff to agree upon 
distribution of funds held under escrow in accordance with 
the rights of plaintiff and defendant as fixed by the 1964 
contract of sale and that plaintiff had at all times refused 
to agree to such distribution. (R.30) Defendant further 
alleged that the total amount of principal paid on the 
Rasmussen contract at date of said answer and counter-
claim was $42,464.73, of which y2 was allocable to James R. 
Meldrum, and that plaintiff had then received $16,117.95 
from funds paid under said contract, also that defendant 
had paid to plaintiff, prior to date of the Rasmussen 
contract $8,004.11 and was further entitled to credit on 
account of payments made by him on plaintiff's portion of 
mortgage debt to Equitable Life Assurance Society in the 
sum of $2,407.00 and $3,000.00 on the Reed Meldrum mort-
gage prior to the Rasmussen contract,—also that there 
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had been paid by the escrow agent subsequent to the 
Rasmussen contract $1,500.00 on the Reed Meldrum 
mortgage and $1,548.52 on the Equitable mortgage—mak-
ing a total of $32,840.00 credits due to defendant on his 
contract with plaintiff (including $262.50 paid on attorney 
fee). 
The defendant prayed that the Court interpret and 
declare the effect of the 1964 contract and the Rasmussen 
contract and adjudge that the 1964 contract was not super-
seded by the Rasmussen contract but was still in full force 
and effect and that the defendant was not in default. 
Plaintiff filed a Reply to defendant's counterclaim 
(R.37) admitting the execution of the 1964 contract with the 
defendant and denying generally defendants allegations as 
to payments received by plaintiff but without any 
specification as to what payments had been received. 
Thereupon defendant under date of February 11, 1972 
made demand upon plaintiff for answer to a series of 
interrogatories. (R.39) To these interrogatories plaintiff 
made answer under date of February 22, 1972 (R.43). 
By these answers plaintiff admitted that she had 
received from defendant prior to the Rasmussen contract 
$8,004.11, and that defendant had then paid $1,450.00 on 
plaintiff's share of mortgage debt to Equitable Life and 
$2,055.68 on her share of the Reed Meldrum mortgage; also 
that plaintiff had received from the escrow agent 
$14,587.95 and $1,250.00 direct from Rasmussen. This made 
a total of $27,347.74 admitted by plaintiff to have been paid 
on the 1964 contract prior to institution of this suit. 
These payments, thus admitted by plaintiff, exceeded by 
several thousand dollars the amount required by the terms 
of the 1964 contract. The contract called for payment of 
$2,500.00 principal, without interest, on or before Decem-
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ber 1 of each year beginning with the year 1964. That totals 
$20,000.00 as of February 1972. But defendant was also to 
have credit for payments made by him on plaintiff's 
portion of mortgage debts which by plaintiff's admissions 
amounted then to $3,505.68. All of which shows that by 
plaintiff's admissions defendant was not in default under 
the terms of the 1964 contract. 
It is obvious that plaintiff's excuse for instituting this 
action in January 1972 was a mistaken theory that the 
Rasmussen contract superseded the 1964 contract—and a 
further mistaken theory that plaintiff was entitled to 
receive 65.81 per cent of all sums payable under the 
Rasmussen contract for defendant's half interest in the 
ranch property. 
Plaintiff will probably argue that additional sums were 
due plaintiff by reason of the clause in the 1964 contract 
that, in case of sale of defendant's interest in the ranch for 
a sum in excess of $40,000.00, then the plaintiff should 
receive one-half of such excess. 
But what is the meaning of that sentence? Does it give 
plaintiff a right of action against defendant after he had 
consented to allow plaintiff to receive from the escrow 
agent one-half of all payments made on defendant's share 
of funds from the Rasmussen contract—until plaintiff was 
fully paid in accordance with the 1964 contract. Does it 
mean that at a time when plaintiff had in fact received 
several thousands of dollars more than was required by 
the 1964 contract, she could then put the defendant to the 
expense of defending an action on the contract? Does it 
mean that at a time when nothing in excess of $40,000.00 
had been paid on defendant's interest in the Rasmussen 
contract, the plaintiff could claim a default by defendant 
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on her contract with him? Defendant submits that the 
answer to these questions is obviously "NO". 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN REJECTING EVI-
DENCE OF DEFENDANT'S OFFERS TO ALLOW 
PLAINTIFF TO RECEIVE FROM THE ESCROW 
AGENT PAYMENTS IN EXCESS OF INSTALL-
MENTS WHICH PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO 
RECEIVE UNDER THE 1964 CONTRACT. 
Defendant offered documentary evidence (Tr. 57, D-1, 
D-2, D-3, D-4, D-5) showing offers made by defendant prior 
to institution of this action to allow plaintiff to receive 
one-half of installments received and to be received by the 
escrow agent for credit of defendant and plaintiff until 
plaintiff was fully paid under the terms of the 1964 
contract. Counsel for Plaintiff objected to reception of 
such evidence upon the ground that it was irrelevant and 
the objection was sustained. (Tr. 59) 
Defendant submits that that ruling was erroneous. The 
evidence went to the heart of issues raised by defendant's 
answer and counterclaim and the ruling cannot be 
reconciled with the Court's decision that the 1964 contract 
is controlling herein. The exhibits offered showed that at 
various times prior to the commencement of this action by 
plaintiff, the defendant offered to allow plaintiff to receive 
from the escrow agent one-half of payments received on 
defendant's portion of the ranch until plaintiff would be 
fully paid under the terms of the 1964 contract. Exhibit D-1 
showed such offer made as early as September 1969. Ex-
hibits D-2, D-3, D-4, D-5 showed that the offer was repeated 
at various times prior to the filing of plaintiff's complaint. 
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POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO MAKE 
SPECIFIC FINDINGS AS TO PAYMENTS MADE 
TO PLAINTIFF AND PAYMENTS MADE UPON 
MORTGAGES FOR WHICH DEFENDANT WAS 
ENTITLED TO CREDIT UNDER THE 1964 
CONTRACT. 
In proposed findings of fact submitted to the Court by 
defendant, it was meticulously set forth the amounts and 
times of payments made to plaintiff and upon mortgages 
for which defendant was entitled to credit. (R.115) 
Demand was made upon plaintiff to specifically state what 
objections, if any, plaintiff made to such proposed 
findings. (R. 125) At the hearing before court on April 10, 
1973, counsel for plaintiff accepted the recapitulation as 
set out in defendants proposed findings. (R.105) Thereaf-
ter, however, on April 17, 1973, counsel for plaintiff 
submitted to the court a Supplemental Memorandum 
(R.105) in which he stated that he had erred as to an item 
of $3,369.60 which he asserted should be $2,407.00. But in 
that memorandum he accepted defendant's recapitulation 
as to remaining items. 
In spite of the foregoing admissions by plaintiff as to 
defendant's proposed findings of fact, the court failed to 
make specific findings on said matters and adopted 
findings of fact proposed by counsel for plaintiff (R.159) 
which fail to show essential facts and contain conclusions 
of law not supported by the evidence and which wholly 
faily to show offers made by defendant to allow plaintiff to 
receive from the escrow agent payments sufficient to fully 
comply with the 1964 contract. 
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POINT V 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS INTERPRETA-
TION OF AN AGREEMENT FOR EXTENSION 
OF TIME AND IN AWARDING INTEREST TO 
PLAINTIFF TO WHICH SHE WAS NOT EN-
TITLED. 
In paragraph 10 of plaintiff's proposed findings of fact 
(R.163)(and which were adopted by the Court over the 
objections of defendant) it is recited that in April 1970 an 
agreement was entered into between the sellers and 
purchasers under the Rasmussen contract whereby it was 
agreed that the 1970 payment under the Rasmussen 
contract was to be deferred and that the purchasers 
agreed that in consideration of such deferment they would 
pay eight per cent interest instead of five and one-half per 
cent. In the following paragraph, towit No. 10 of said 
proposed findings, it is receited that the payment made by 
Rasmussens on May 5, 1971 included $14,825.23 as interest 
"of which $3,323.03 represented the interest on the 
Plaintiff's aforesaid $19,025.00 which sum of money is now 
being held in escrow by the Walker Bank and Trust 
Company of Provo, Utah and should be turned to the 
Plaintiff". 
Defendant specifically objected to said proposed finding 
(R-182,183) (and also to finding Nos. 7, 9, 11 and 12) upon 
the ground that they erroneously assumed that plaintiff 
was entitled to interest not required by the 1964 contract. 
Defendant also contended that nothing in the 1970 
extension agreement or in the Rasmussen contract 
required payment of interest to plaintiff except as pro-
vided by the language of the 1964 contract. 
A reading of the 1970 extension agreement (R.68) clearly 
shows the merit of defendant's objection. There is no word 
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of agreement therein which calls for payment to plaintiff, 
nor any word of agreement between defendant and 
plaintiff as to whom the additional interest, or any interest 
accruing under the terms of the original Rasmussen 
contract shall be paid. And the Court had, by its 
Memorandum Decisions of March 7, 1973 ruled that the 
rights of plaintiff and defendant are to be determined by 
teh 1964 agreement. The agreement specifically provides 
that no interest shall be charged except in case of default 
by defendant and then only at the rate of three per cent per 
annum. 
The evidence herein which was offered by defendant 
(See exhibit D-l) shows that as early as September 1969 
and at numerous times thereafter, (D-2, D-3, D-4, D-5) the 
defendant offered to allow plaintiff to receive one-half of 
payment made to the escrow agent on the portion of the 
ranch covered by the 1964 contract. 
The admissions of plaintiff (R.105) further show that the 
plaintiff did in fact receive currently from the escrow 
agent one-half of each installment paid on the Rasmussen 
contract on defendant's portion of the ranch (excepting 
only the 1971 installment—and defendant offered to allow 
plaintiff to receive one-half of that—and she did receive 
$7,585.45 of it). These payments so received by plaintiff 
were in addition to payments made by the escrow agent on 
mortgages referred to in the 1964 contract. 
In Finding No. 11 (R. 163) the Court erred in adopting a 
conclusion of law embodied in plaintiff's proposed finding 
No. 11 to the effect that $3,323.03 of a payment made by 
Rasmussens on May 5, 1971 "represented" interested 
which should be turned to the plaintiff". 
That conclusions is based upon a contention of plaintiff 
that plaintiff is entitled to interest on one-half of the excess 
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over $40,000.00 for which defendant sold his interest in the 
property covered by his 1964 contract with plaintiff and 
that such interested should be computed from the date of 
the Rasmussen contract. In other words, plaintiff's coun-
sel contends that a sale was made as soon an executory 
contract of sale was signed—regardless of when payment 
was received—and regardless of when, or whether ever, 
defendant received his $40,000.00 under the contract of 
sale. 
Defendant submits that the language of the 1964 contract 
cannot be so construed. The agreement was that 
4
'In the event the buyer sells his interest in the 
above described property or assigns this contract 
in the lifetime of the seller for a sum in excess of the 
purchase price herein, Forty Thousand Dollars, 
that in such event he will pay one-half of the excess 
to the seller from the first three payments under 
such sale. , , 
That cannot reasonably be construed to bind defendant to 
pay interest to plaintiff on the purchase price until it was 
received from his purchaser. And certainly not until the 
date the purchase was bound to pay. The Rasmussen 
contract called for a total price of $158,000.00 for the 
ranch—including the James R. Meldrum half interest. The 
purchase price was to be payable in installments, viz; a 
down payment of $5,000.00 ($4,000.00 of which went to 
realtor's commission) and $20,000.00 on or before May 1, 
1969 and the balance in annual installments of $19,000.00 
plus interest at 5V2 per cent per annum on the 1st day of 
May in the years 1971, 1972, 1973, 1974, 1975 and 1976. 
It will readilly be seen that if defendant should be 
chargeable for interest on one-half of the excess over 
$40,000.00 of the sale price regardless of when the price 
would be paid, it would be an unconscionable burden for 
him. 24 
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The ruling, granting interest to plaintiff, and denying 
interest to defendant, fails to give consideration to the fact 
that defendant not only consented at all times to allow 
plaintiff to receive from the escrow agent one-half of pay-
ments received on the Rasmussen contract until plaintiff 
was fully paid under the 1964 contract—but also that 
plaintiff refused to let the escrow agent pay to defendant 
the balance due defendant. He was thereby deprived of 
interest from August 18, 1972 (when final payment was 
made to the escrow agent) until after the decision of this 
case on February 26, 1974. 
Furthermore, counsel for plaintiff, in his proposed 
findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment, which 
were adopted by the Court, claimed interested in the 
aggregate amount of $4,122.96 (R.166) In arriving at that 
figure, counsel wholly failed to give consideration to the 
fact that plaintiff had currently received from the escrow 
agent payments which greatly exceed the instalments of 
$2,500.00 per year required by the 1964 contract. The 
excess over that figure should have been credited on the 
$19,025.00 claimed by plaintiff under the clause calling for 
payment to her of one-half of the excess over $40,000.00 for 
which defendant's interest in the ranch was sold. But 
counsel, in his zeal to get the ultimate amount from the 
defendant, induced the Court to allow interest on the 
$19,025.00 during the entire period from date of the 
Rasmussen contract until the date of judgment her in. 
Defendant submits that he was not in default at the time 
of commencement of this action, nor at any time 
thereafter, and that the award of interest to plaintiff and 
denial of interest to defendant cannot be approved. 
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POINT VI 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFEN-
DANT JUDGMENT FOR INTEREST AND FOR 
HIS COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES. 
Plaintiff's complaint was based upon the irrational and 
arbitrary contention that her 1964 contract with her son 
was superseded by the Rasmussen contract and that 
plaintiff was entitled to 65.81 per cent of all funds due and 
to become due under that contract on the interest in the 
ranch property covered by the 1964 contract. The trial 
court ruled against that contention (R.87)— and that ruling 
was obviously correct as a careful reading of both 
contracts will show. Also it seems obvious that the mother 
must have had some very bad advice or she would not have 
begun this lawsuit against her son when she had already 
received payments greatly in excess of installments due 
under her contract with him and when he had repeatedly 
offered to allow her to receive a greater percentage of 
funds paid and to be paid under the Rasmussen contract 
than was required under the 1964 contract. These points 
were fully set forth in defendant's answer and counter-
claim and counsel was thereby charged with notice of 
defendant's rights. But in spite of this, and even after the 
Court had announced its decision that the 1964 contract 
was not superseded or modified by the Rasmussen 
contract, plaintiff's counsel continued to delay disposition 
of the case by dilatory motions and objections. Defendant 
repeatedly submitted to counsel for plaintiff demands for 
answers to interrogatories as to payments received by 
plaintiff and as to receipts and distribution of funds by the 
escrow agent—also as to offers made by defendant to allow 
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payments ;<> •- nid<n >-. ;, i,rM':i i- :>v H 91, R.125 hut 
plaintiff ine\< usahh delayed answer . - u* h mpinoua 
tories ;m*l • HI< .;. f- *ikt* specific ar^wers H\ <V\M-
dilator) ^-.M - a ureal and needless but den was put upon 
the Court and upon counsel lor defendant -and an uncon-
scionably lengthy and confus?"$i r^ord was needlessly 
accumulated. 
Defendant further submits that the i Mir <•:*!<*.:• n. •* 
jecting defendants r«;i|u* -t Un Jit.v f , ,>sts and * ;^ ,M« > 
fee. The t <MI»M jndicated its reason |(>< ^ulh a^:o*i ;.* 
follows: (R. 166) 
. "21. The Court further finds that each of the par ties 
visited the same Attorney for the drafting of the 
original 1964 contract and that said parties were 
acting for their mutual interest and benefit under 
the Rasmussen contract, and that said Court's 
determination of the rights of the parties and 
obligations of said parties was not the fault of either 
of said parties, and therefore no attorneys fees or 
costs are awarded with each of said parties to bear 
their own costs and attorney's fees", 
Defendant submits that under the facts and cii cumstan-
ces of this case that conclusion of the court was clearly 
erroneous. The mere fact that the parties relied upon the 
same attorney foi the drafting of the original contract 
between them ought not to be made a reason for denying 
costs and attorney fee to one of the parties who is 
needlessly put to expense and trouble of defending aginst 
a suit brought to attempt to force him payment from him 
of an amount greatly in excess of the amount called for by 
that contract. And if the attorney who drafted the original 
contract becomes attorney for one party against the other, 
and is succeeded by another attorney for the plaintiff, who 
institutes and action against defendant on an unjust claim, 
should that be any basis for denying costs and attorney fee 
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to the party who was not at fault or in default? Can it be 
said the plaintiff was not at fault in instituting this action 
where she claimed 65.81 percent of funds for which the 
contract property was sold when the contract clearly did 
not contemplate such a result? 
And when if it is further shown that at the time of 
institution of this suit plaintiff had been paid far more than 
/the installments required by the contract between the 
parties—and that defendant had theretofore repeatedly 
offered to allow plaintiff to continue to receive install-
ments substantially in excess of installments required by 
their contract—can there be any basis for denying the 
defendant his costs and attorney fee under a contract 
which specifically provides that in case of a suit the party 
at fault shall pay to the other his costs and attorney fee? 
POINT VII 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFEN-
DANT'S MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE TO PER-
MIT DEFENDANT TO PRODUCE EVIDENCE 
OF PAYMENTS MADE BY THE ESCROW 
AGENT FOR WHICH DEFENDANT WAS EN-
TITLED TO CREDIT. 
On November 13, 1973, this case was called for hearing 
on defendant's motion for ruling upon legal issues and on 
plaintiff's objections to proposed findings of fact, conclu-
sions of law and judgment proposed by defendant. (Tr. 
A-8) The Court on that day requested counsel for the par-
ties to endeavor to agree upon remaining issues. Counsel 
discussed the matter and reported to the court that they 
could not agree. The Court then called upon counsel for 
plaintiff to state his points of objection to defendant's pro-
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posed findings of lad, (TY. A-page 8 9 10^  Thereafter 
defendant offered documentary exhibits iD-i. b-2, D 3. D-4 
and D-5) (Tr. A-p. 57, 58, 59, 60) to show offers by defender.I 
to allow payments to be made to plaintiff by the esn-n* 
agent Plaintiff object to this upon the ground \UM < ^a>. 
irrelevant and the Court sustained the ol-jt^ion IVUMI 
dant also offered in evidence Exhibits I) 6 ;i:i<i ; > 7 *o ;*i m r 
payments made to plaintiff and upon mortgages by the es-
crow agent. Plaintiff objected to this offer and the Court 
sustained the objection. Tr B-p.8-10) Defendant then 
moved U>v ;: ' = >ntmiiance **•'*• die hearing to allow defendant 
to call witni'S^s to prove1 pa\m*-T;{.- made by the escrow 
agent. '! * 1: 'J Pi.-rirnfi objected *•) this and the Court 
sustained the objection. The case was then taken i inder 
advisement by the cVmrt 
Defendant then tiled whjtH hui:, w, pi oposed fii idings of 
fact and conclusions of law and judgment propsed by 
plaintif* h :U2- and al.M> n\vi] a ;m>tion for the court to 
i nake specif^ findings cr is;io oi fact referred to in 
defendant's objections -H i.i',"1 Defendant's objections 
and motion were overruled and denied by the Court and 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment sub-
stantially as proposed by plaintiff were signed and 
entered. Defendant contends that these are erroneous in 
the matters set forth in defendant's objections oi i file 
herein. Defendant also contends that findings Nos. 7, 9,10, 
11,19, 20 and 21 are not findings of fact but conclusions of 
law and are not supported by the evidence. Also that the 
court erred in refusing to show offers by defendant of 
documentary exhibits to show payments made by the 
escrow agent arid offers i nade by defendant to permit 
payments to plaintiff in excess of payments required by 
the 1964 contract. 
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CONCLUSION 
In conclusion the defendant (appellant) submits that this 
court should reverse the rulings of the trial court on points 
herein contended by defendant to be erroneous, and direct 
judgment to be entered in favor of defendant as prayed for 
in his counterclaim. 
The points referred to in this brief, and relied upon by 
defendant for redetermination by the appelate court, are 
so well established that it appears to counsel for defendant 
that citations of cases or authorities to support such points 
will be wholly needless. But if counsel for plaintiff 
questions this, and cites any legal authorities to the 
contrary, then counsel for defendant will reply thereto. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Will L. Hoyt 
Attorney for 
Defandant 
(Appellant) 
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